Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa intends to participate in the proceedings of the eighty-first session of the United Nations General Assembly in New York, marking his second consecutive participation following his initial appearance before the General Assembly in September 2025.
There is a significant difference between the two visits: during his first participation, the primary Syrian objective was to consolidate Damascus's return to the international community and end its isolation and sanctions. This time, however, al-Sharaa arrives bearing a series of transformations achieved within a single year, enabling him to attempt to shift relations with the international community from the phase of recognizing the new government to that of reaping political, economic, and security dividends from this recognition. The most prominent transformations between the two participations can be summarized across 4 key files:
1. Syria outside regional and international axis politics: Damascus seeks to establish itself as a state unaligned with regional and international axes, having departed from its previous position within the Iranian axis without shifting to an alternative one. This approach has been clearly demonstrated in its avoidance of involvement in the "US-Israeli" war with Iran, its refusal of military engagement in Lebanon, as well as Syria's avoidance of declaring an official position on the Mecca Joint Defense Agreement, consistent with its desire to steer clear of defense commitments that might pull it back into the politics of alliances and axes. In the same context, Damascus has maintained a balanced relationship with Russia despite the Ukrainian war and "Russian-Western" disputes, redefining the nature of the Russian presence in Syria such that Moscow no longer enjoys the level of political and military influence it possessed during the Assad era, while its military presence continues under new arrangements with the Syrian state.
2. Syria exits the sanctions regime and international isolation: For the first time since 1979, the United States has dismantled the bulk of the comprehensive sanctions regime imposed on Syria; the Caesar Act was repealed in December 2025, before Washington removed Syria from the State Sponsors of Terrorism list in August 2026. The European Union also lifted economic sanctions imposed on Syria and reactivated cooperation and partnership with it, while the League of Arab States decided in September 2026 to lift the political, economic, and social sanctions imposed on the Syrian state and its institutions, alongside the continuation of certain individual measures against persons and entities associated with the Assad regime. Syria has thus transitioned from the stage of comprehensive sanctions that constrained state and economic activity to a stage where remaining restrictions are tied more specifically to targeted individuals and entities. This transformation enables financial and trade reconnection, the inflow of investments, and the financing of recovery and reconstruction projects; however, it simultaneously places a heavier burden on the government to prove its ability to translate the lifting of sanctions into tangible economic and living improvements, particularly amid growing public discontent over prices, services, and fuel.
3. Syria exits weapons of mass destruction files for the first time: In July 2026, the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) reinstated all of Syria's rights and privileges, which had been suspended since 2021, following progress in cooperation, disclosure, and verification regarding the chemical program inherited from the Assad regime, in tandem with the launch of operations to accelerate the disposal of the remnants and components of this program within Syrian territory. Furthermore, in September 2026, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Board of Governors closed Syria's non-compliance file, which had remained open since 2011, following Damascus's cooperation with verification processes and the placement of discovered materials under IAEA safeguards. The ratification of the Biological Weapons Convention, which Syria signed in 1972 without becoming a full party to it, remains a complementary step toward fully closing WMD-related files. This trajectory affords Damascus an opportunity to present itself as a state that cooperates with international oversight bodies, while shrinking the ground for justifications Israel uses to rationalize some of its military operations inside Syria based on concerns over unconventional weapons.
4. Syria has become a partner in the Global Coalition against Terrorism: Syria officially joined the Global Coalition to Defeat Daesh/ISIS in November 2025, becoming its 90th member, and subsequently took part in its official meetings throughout 2026. This development transitions the Syrian government from a state on whose territory international counter-terrorism operations were conducted without its partnership, into an official partner within the international framework combating ISIS. This entails greater responsibilities in pursuing the group's cells, securing prisons and camps, addressing the foreign fighters issue, and cooperating with states to repatriate their detained nationals from Syria. Al-Sharaa can leverage this transformation in New York to underscore that Syria has become a security partner to the international community in countering terrorism.
Alongside these four transformations, President al-Sharaa will reintroduce two fundamental files regarding which he had previously called on the international community to assume its responsibilities. However, developments over the past year provide him this time with additional tools to raise them, namely:
First: Halting Israeli attacks and restoring Syrian sovereignty: Damascus will once again call on the international community to exert pressure to halt recurrent Israeli strikes and incursions into Syrian territory, and emphasize the necessity of the withdrawal of Israeli forces from the areas entered after December 8, 2024, and a return to the 1974 disengagement arrangements and lines, while adhering to the unity of Syrian territory and the illegitimacy of any change imposed by Israel by force in the southern region. What is new this time, however, is that these demands coincide with an ongoing security negotiation track mediated by the United States, allowing Damascus to attempt to leverage the UN and international stance to bolster its position within the negotiations themselves, rather than replace them. Al-Sharaa can also recall General Assembly Resolution 80/82 regarding the occupied Syrian Golan, which was adopted by a majority of 146 states, and capitalize on Syria's cooperation on chemical, nuclear, and counter-terrorism files to assert that the security justifications upon which Israel bases its military interventions inside Syria have become weaker than before.
Second: Transforming international openness into economic support and reconstruction: Al-Sharaa will seek to push the international community to transition from the phase of lifting sanctions to that of supporting economic recovery and reconstruction. This will be pursued by urging donor states to fulfill their commitments regarding humanitarian assistance, directing a larger share of funding toward early recovery projects, infrastructure, and basic services, alongside requesting international expertise to assist with financial and administrative reform, rebuilding state institutions, and improving public resource management. Damascus will also strive to encourage foreign investment following the removal of most legal and banking restrictions that previously hindered capital inflows into Syria, presenting opportunities and strategic agreements across the oil, gas, minerals, ports, agriculture, industry, and infrastructure sectors. In this context, the government will need to emphasize that lifting sanctions is not an economic outcome in and of itself, and that its success will be measured by its ability to translate political and legal openness into growth, job opportunities, and improvements in service levels and household income.
There are also other milestones achieved by the government that are expected to feature in al-Sharaa's speech, foremost among them the formation of the People's Assembly and the commencement of its work during 2026, progress in implementing the integration agreement with the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), alongside measures concerning transitional justice, programs to enhance social cohesion, and steps toward reforming and restructuring state institutions.
Thus, al-Sharaa's second visit to New York differs from the first in the nature of the message he carries: in 2025, he sought primarily to break the isolation and convince the world to engage with the new authority, whereas in 2026, he will seek to demonstrate that Damascus has fulfilled a significant portion of the commitments demanded by the international community.