US–Syrian relations are entering a new phase of security cooperation, marked by the US Department of State's amendment of the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR), effective 1 October 2026, to remove Syria from the list of countries subject to a policy of denial regarding licenses for the export of defense articles and defense services. This step coincides with the announcement on 30 September by the United States and its partners in the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS regarding the continuation of counter-ISIS operations in Syria from the Joint Task Force headquarters in Jordan, alongside the formal conclusion of Operation Inherent Resolve in Iraq following a 12-year military mission.
The concurrency of these two steps allows the United States to link operational field cooperation with the development of the capabilities of Syria's military and security institutions. The continuation of the counter-ISIS mission in cooperation with the Syrian government provides a framework for operational coordination, while the amendment to the defense export policy enables the case-by-case review of arms and equipment requests.
The continuation of the mission in Syria, juxtaposed with the transition of US cooperation with Iraq into a direct bilateral defense framework, underscores a divergence in security partnership requirements. In Syria, countering ISIS coincides with the rebuilding of military and security institutions and the integration of forces, rendering capability development a fundamental component of cooperation with Washington.
The continuation of the mission affords the United States an opportunity to bolster cooperation with Syrian government forces, potentially helping to advance the integration of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) into military and security institutions. Countering ISIS necessitates intelligence sharing, the distribution of responsibilities, and the conduct of joint operations, which could help translate integration arrangements into regular field-level cooperation. However, the efficacy of this process remains contingent on unifying the chain of command and stabilizing organizational structures, ensuring that support is directed toward institutions capable of managing operations and tracking their outcomes.
The United States appears inclined toward greater reliance on local partners and stand-off support from regional locations in combating ISIS. This shift is reflected in the continuation of its operations in Syria from the Joint Task Force headquarters in Jordan, despite the complete withdrawal of its forces from Syrian territory on 16 April 2026. The revision of the defense export policy toward Syria facilitates this approach by developing the capabilities of local institutions tasked with operational responsibility for countering the group.
Furthermore, Syrian measures to secure the borders with Iraq and Lebanon and disrupt Iranian militia supply lines provide additional ground for converging security interests with Washington. Enhancing the ability of Syrian institutions to control borders curbs the movement of armed groups and supply networks, increasing their reliability in countering threats beyond the fight against ISIS. This could encourage Washington to expand security cooperation with Damascus, depending on the effectiveness and sustainability of these measures.
This cooperation grants the United States an opportunity to maintain its influence in Syria following its troop withdrawal by participating in the development of military and security institutional capabilities. Providing access to US defense articles and services could diversify Damascus's options—part of whose previous Russian arsenal remains operational—and gradually diminish its dependence on traditional weapons sources. Nonetheless, success hinges in practice on the specific types of equipment Washington approves for export, the availability of financing, and the capacity of Syrian institutions to absorb and operate these systems.
The evolution of this security partnership could also influence US investment opportunities in Syria, particularly in the energy sector. Enhancing institutional capacity to maintain security and border control helps mitigate risks facing companies, facilities, and supply corridors. Security cooperation could thus support a US economic presence, although the appeal of the Syrian market remains contingent on legal and regulatory stability, financing availability, and infrastructure rehabilitation.
In sum, the continuation of counter-ISIS operations in Syria following the military withdrawal, coupled with the opening of case-by-case reviews for arms requests, indicates a US strategic orientation toward relying on Syrian military and security forces and supporting their capabilities via stand-off assistance from outside the country. This trajectory affords Damascus an opportunity to upgrade its military and security capabilities, while enabling Washington to retain leverage over counterterrorism and border security files. Cooperation is likely to advance incrementally based on operational field outcomes and the stabilization of the integration process with the SDF, with its tangible scope ultimately reflected in the training and equipment programs approved and implemented.

