Introduction
About a year and a half has passed since the signing of the 10 March 2025 agreement between President Ahmed al-Sharaa and Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) Commander Mazloum Abdi. During this period, negotiations and implementation overlapped to varying degrees, before practical application gained greater momentum in early February 2026. Up until mid-August, implementation encompassed military formations, security agencies, and civil institutions, but it has not yet culminated in dismantling the SDF's organizational structure or fully transferring military and security decision-making to state institutions.
The process currently centers on integrating SDF personnel and institutions and gradually transferring their affiliation to the Ministries of Defense and Interior as well as remaining government bodies, alongside ongoing negotiations over files left unresolved by previous agreements. Most prominent among these are the status of the Women's Protection Units (YPJ), the remaining forces not covered under the initial arrangements, the future of the SDF General Command, and the position of Mazloum Abdi and other commanders in the final organizational structure.
In other words, the dispute is no longer over the principle of integration as much as its nature and scope: whether it will be confined to absorbing existing formations and institutions into state structures, or whether it will also entail the complete transfer of military, security, and financial decision-making to the government and the dissolution of the SDF as an independent organization.
First: The Reality of the Integration Track
Since February 2026, the implementation of the integration agreement has focused on three parallel tracks: a military track that began by incorporating components of the SDF into army-affiliated formations, registering personnel, and training them; a security track involving the deployment of the Ministry of Interior in al-Hasakah, Qamishli, and Ayn al-Arab; and a civil track aimed at transferring institutions and employees to state structures. However, the pace of progress varied across these tracks, with military and security integration proving far more pronounced than administrative and civil integration.
Military measures were grounded in the agreement of 29 January 2026, which stipulated the establishment of a division comprising three brigades of SDF personnel, in addition to a brigade in Ayn al-Arab in the Aleppo countryside to be integrated into one of the army divisions affiliated with Aleppo Governorate. This formula enabled the collective absorption of SDF formations, in contrast to the individual integration model outlined in the 18 January agreement, with their affiliation gradually shifting to the Ministry of Defense.
Implementation of the integration process commenced with registering personnel and officers and regularizing their status, followed by enrolling batches of them into the ministry's training system. This became evident on 10 June 2026, when personnel from the Qamishlo Brigade were transferred to al-Nabk camp in Rif Dimashq for training, before the majority returned to their deployment areas in early July.
This step gained significance extending beyond the training itself, as it initiated the transfer of responsibility for preparing and supervising personnel from the SDF's former system to the central military establishment, while maintaining their deployment in their previous localities. However, the return of personnel to their deployment areas made their operational subordination and command chain the primary benchmark for evaluating the reality of integration, rather than their mere registration or training under the Ministry of Defense.
Integration also extended beyond personnel and formations to include certain commanders, as former SDF military figures transitioned into positions within the official establishment—most notably Sipan Hemo, who assumed a post in the Ministry of Defense related to the Eastern Region. Nevertheless, the absorption of some commanders did not resolve the fate of the SDF General Command or Mazloum Abdi's position within the final military hierarchy.
On the security track, the deployment of Ministry of Interior forces in al-Hasakah and Qamishli began in early February 2026, alongside coordination with the Asayish forces to resolve the status of their personnel and headquarters and gradually transition their functions and subordination to the ministry. This process remains underway, as governmental deployment and operational coordination do not necessarily signify the completed transfer of security agency administration and command authority.
As for civil integration, it covered—to varying degrees—the sectors of education, health, electricity, agriculture, internal trade, and consumer protection, alongside activating the directorates of culture, tourism, antiquities, postal services, and the Central Bank of Syria branch, while efforts continued to complete the integration of civil registries. The breadth of the sectors involved demonstrates that the track has moved beyond transferring a limited number of institutions; however, it has not reached a uniform level of integration across all sectors, given the need to transition institutions that functioned for years within the Autonomous Administration into a state apparatus governed by distinct laws, administrative structures, and funding mechanisms. The process also extended to the restructuring of local administration; on 19 July 2026, appointments were issued for directors of districts and sub-districts in al-Hasakah Governorate, including Qamishli, al-Malikiyah, Ras al-Ayn, al-Yaarubiyah, and al-Jawadiyah, alongside the formation of an interim executive bureau for the provincial council. The appointments included figures who previously held positions within Autonomous Administration institutions, reflecting a tendency to absorb part of its cadres into state institutions rather than completely dismantling the former administrative structure. Integration similarly addressed higher education, as discussions began regarding the future of universities in al-Hasakah Governorate, encompassing the opening of a state university and reorganizing the status of "Rojava University," alongside adopting the national curriculum in Arabic for general education and introducing the Kurdish language as a school subject. This reflects the transition of the process from merely integrating civil servants and service facilities to tackling the educational and administrative frameworks established during the years of Autonomous Administration rule. Conversely, the status of the Women's Protection Units (YPJ) remained one of the most prominent unresolved files, given the SDF's insistence on maintaining the autonomy of women's formations against the Syrian government's adherence to a unified chain of command. Negotiations revealed that the dispute shifted to deliberating the specific form of the units' integration; a YPJ delegation met with Minister of Defense Murhaf Abu Qasra in April 2026 and presented a written draft regarding their organizational structure, which included a proposal for their accession to the Ministry of Interior as an autonomous counterterrorism force. However, the proposal remained under discussion without an official decision. The continued negotiations over the YPJ reflect part of the broader dilemma regarding forces that have not completed integration; accepting the inclusion of the units into a state institution does not in itself resolve the integration issue unless their subordination, chain of command, and jurisdictions are definitively established. Furthermore, shifting discussions to the modalities of incorporating the units into state institutions reduces the likelihood that this file alone will derail the entire process, making it more likely to impact the pace and final form of complete integration.
Should the Syrian government agree to integrate the Women's Protection Units as an autonomous force under any subordination or designation, it would practically amount to recycling the formation within state institutions rather than integrating it. This would weaken the process of eliminating factionalism, which is supposed to apply to all former forces and formations. Such an exception could also establish a precedent enabling other formations to demand preserving their independent leaderships and structures in exchange for accepting nominal state subordination, ultimately institutionalizing factionalism within military and security bodies rather than eradicating it.
The continuity of political meetings confirms that implementation has not concluded negotiations, but has rather shifted them to the operational details of formations, leadership, and local authorities. President of the Kurdistan Region of Iraq Nechirvan Barzani visited Damascus in August 2026 and met with President Ahmed al-Sharaa, before al-Sharaa and Mazloum Abdi met the following day to discuss progress in executing the January agreement and completing the integration process. Second: Background to the Integration Track
The 10 March 2025 agreement laid down the initial framework for the SDF's integration, stipulating the integration of all civil and military institutions in northeastern Syria into the state, including border crossings, the airport, and oil and gas fields, alongside guaranteeing constitutional rights for Kurds, the return of displaced persons, a ceasefire, and the rejection of partition, with implementation slated for completion before the end of 2025.
However, the agreement established the overarching principle of integration without settling its execution mechanisms, particularly regarding the modalities of integrating forces, the chain of command, and the future of institutions established by the Autonomous Administration. Consequently, negotiations over the following months focused on interpreting the concept of integration and translating it into actionable arrangements.
The Syrian government insisted on a unified army, a centralized chain of command, and consolidated sovereign institutions, whereas the SDF sought to join the army as cohesive formations while retaining a degree of security and administrative authority.
Persistent disagreements over these issues led to the expiration of the deadline set under the March agreement without achieving full implementation. Nevertheless, the expiration of the deadline did not mark the start of an entirely separate path; rather, it prompted intensified negotiations and the reformulation of integration terms in light of altered military and political conditions in early 2026.
The military clashes that erupted in Aleppo in early January 2026 —and subsequently expanded eastward— fundamentally shifted the balance of power between the two parties. The SDF lost most of its areas of influence in the governorates of Raqqa and Deir ez-Zor and parts of the Aleppo countryside, in addition to strategic resources and facilities that previously afforded it economic and political leverage in negotiations.
This shift in the balance of power led the government to restructure its approach across two interrelated tracks: a military track aimed at ending the existence of any armed force independent of the army, and a political track seeking to decouple the settlement of Kurdish rights from the future of the SDF as an organization operating parallel to the state.
In this context, President Ahmed al-Sharaa issued Decree No. 13 on 16 January 2026, which recognized Kurds as an indigenous component of the Syrian people, addressed the consequences of the 1962 al-Hasakah census, and granted citizenship to unregistered individuals (Maktumeen). The decree thereby resolved an aspect of what Kurds regarded as historic grievances, while simultaneously depriving the SDF of part of its ability to leverage these grievances to justify maintaining its separate military and administrative structure.
The altered balance of power was reflected in the 18 January 2026 agreement, which closely mirrored the government's perspective. It stipulated the handover of sovereign institutions and resources —including border crossings and oil and gas fields— to the state, the transfer of files on ISIS-related prisons and camps, and the individual integration of SDF personnel into the Ministries of Defense and Interior.
However, disagreements over implementation mechanisms and the status of the SDF in al-Hasakah and Qamishli impeded the execution of the agreement in its original form. Negotiations shifted toward seeking a formula that achieved unity of the military establishment without requiring the immediate dissolution of SDF forces. These talks produced the agreement of 29 January 2026, which became the operational foundation for the subsequent process.
The new agreement proved more flexible than the 18 January formula; it provided for a comprehensive ceasefire, phased military and administrative integration, the withdrawal of military forces from lines of contact, the entry of Ministry of Interior forces into al-Hasakah and Qamishli, and the initiation of security and civil institution integration.
Thus, the 29 January agreement did not resolve the debate over the final integration framework, but it enabled practical implementation to commence alongside ongoing negotiations through transitional arrangements that absorbed SDF formations into the army and progressively transferred institutional subordination to the state.
Third: Factors Influencing the Integration Track
The completion of integration is governed by a set of internal and external factors that propel the track forward, while shaping its pace, ultimate configuration, and the extent of actual decision-making transferred to the government.
1. The Balance of Power Between the Government and the SDF:
The shifted balance of power since January 2026 represents one of the most prominent drivers of the track. The SDF lost significant areas of influence and economic resources, and could no longer negotiate from its former position of strength. Conversely, the government gained greater capacity to assert the principle of military institutional unity and control over sovereign assets and facilities.
Nevertheless, the SDF retains a substantial military and security manpower base, organizational expertise, and local deployment in parts of al-Hasakah Governorate. This has prompted the government to dismantle its autonomy through gradual absorption rather than immediate dissolution, which could risk a security vacuum or renewed confrontation.
Accordingly, the government's approach seeks to preserve the SDF's personnel base and incorporate it into state institutions, in exchange for transferring instruments of command, funding, training, and armament to relevant ministries. Consequently, the actual transfer of decision-making authority—rather than the continued stationing of personnel in their home regions or within cohesive units—serves as the decisive metric for the success of this track.
2. The "US–Western" Role:
The United States played a primary role in formulating the transitional integration model. Following the SDF's military retreats, the US approach pivoted from maintaining the existing status quo in northeastern Syria toward encouraging the SDF to integrate into the state, alongside ensuring the uninterrupted fight against ISIS and preventing any security vacuum.
On this basis, US Envoy Tom Barrack met in Erbil on 22 January 2026 with Mazloum Abdi and Ilham Ahmed, affirming Washington's backing for the integration process and framing the consolidation of the ceasefire as an entry point for sustained negotiations and implementation.
This stance broadened on 27 January to encompass France, the United Kingdom, and Germany alongside the United States, all supporting the peaceful and lasting integration of northeastern Syria into a unified state. This provided Western cover for a middle-ground formula reconciling the immediate individual integration sought by Damascus with the preservation of organizational military structures pursued by the SDF.
The US role did not conclude with the signing of the agreement, continuing to accompany its implementation. The Kurdistan Region of Iraq remained a primary arena of engagement between Washington and the Kurdish leadership; on 16 June 2026, Nechirvan Barzani hosted US Envoy Tom Barrack and Mazloum Abdi in Erbil, with discussions focusing on integration developments alongside counterterrorism and regional stability.
On another front, the issue of ISIS detainees and detention facilities in northeastern Syria could become an influential factor shaping the US position regarding the nuances of integration. The SDF continues to administer and guard four prisons housing ISIS elements. The United States may prefer the SDF's continued performance of this mission, particularly if Syrian ISIS detainees in Iraq are repatriated to Syria, whether during the transitional phase or within subsequent security arrangements.
Overall, the US and Western posture supports sustaining integration and averting a relapse into armed hostilities. However, the impact of the counter-ISIS portfolio on the final architecture of integration remains unresolved: it could either accelerate the transfer of responsibilities to state institutions in coordination with the International Coalition, or prompt the temporary preservation of certain security functions managed by the SDF until an effective state alternative is fully established.
3. The Turkish Peace Track with the Kurdistan Workers' Party:
The future of the SDF's integration is increasingly tied to the ongoing peace process in Turkey with the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK). Progress on this track diminishes the rationale for maintaining cross-border military structures and facilitates distinguishing between Syrian elements eligible for state absorption and non-Syrian elements required to leave the country.
Since the outset of implementation, Turkey has prioritized the security outcomes of the process over its administrative nuances. This was underscored by Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan on 29 January 2026, who emphasized the necessity of expelling non-Syrian PKK elements and cross-border armed groups from SDF areas, establishing a unified Syrian army under a single command, and leaving local policing and administrative details to agreements between Damascus and the SDF, asserting that Ankara does not seek to micromanage these issues directly.
The political linkage between the two processes was articulated by President Recep Tayyip Erdogan on 5 February 2026, who noted that the Damascus–SDF agreement alleviated pressure on the Turkish peace process, stating that the SDF's adherence to the pact would foster stability in Syria. While this linkage does not mean one process is entirely contingent on the other, it indicates that headway in either domain helps diminish obstacles confronting the other.
The Turkish track advanced from political contacts to more institutional legal arrangements in August 2026. On 10 August, the Turkish Parliament ratified legislation providing a framework for disarming and dissolving the PKK, regularizing the status of a segment of its cadres, and reintegrating them. This completed the path initiated by Abdullah Ocalan's call in February 2025 and the party's subsequent declaration ending armed operations in May 2025.
This synchronicity gained added significance when the Turkish government removed Sipan Hemo from its wanted lists on 14 August 2026, following his transition from a prominent command position in the People's Protection Units (YPG) to an official post in the Syrian Ministry of Defense. This step signaled Turkey's acceptance of absorbing former Syrian SDF commanders and personnel into state structures, provided it terminates their military autonomy and severs their organizational and military links to the PKK.
Thus, progress in the Turkish peace track fosters an environment more conducive to the SDF's integration by dismantling cross-border military ties and narrowing options for preserving its former status. Conversely, any collapse of the process or resurgence of conflict between Turkey and the PKK could heighten Turkish sensitivity toward SDF formations, renewing pressure on Damascus to expedite the complete dismantling of the group's military and security architecture.
4. Internal and Regional Security Risks:
The integration process faces internal risks associated with the reconfiguration of power dynamics in al-Hasakah. Groups such as the Revolutionary Youth and networks of former regime remnants remain capable of exploiting any dispute between Damascus and the SDF, or any vacuum arising during the reorganization and transition of responsibilities among security bodies.
These risks may be exacerbated by the ramifications of the Iranian war and the potential rise in the strategic importance of eastern Syria and the Iraqi border in the calculations of Iran and its affiliated factions. This dynamic could open avenues for exploiting any security setbacks to reassert influence or exert leverage over the Syrian government.
This implies that the success of integration is not contingent solely upon reaching political and military understandings; it equally depends on the ability of the government and the SDF to manage the transitional phase, maintain security during the devolution of authorities, and prevent the emergence of actors seeking to exploit rifts or voids accompanying the restructuring of military and security apparatuses.
Conclusion
The process of integrating the SDF into the Syrian state continues to combine implementation and negotiation simultaneously. Despite the establishment of army-affiliated brigades, the registration and training of personnel, the deployment of the Ministry of Interior, and the absorption of select commanders and civil servants into state institutions, negotiations remain ongoing regarding overall leadership, women's formations, and local security and administrative powers.
The prospects of a deceleration in integration appear higher than those of outright collapse: the SDF has lost key resources and areas of control, the United States no longer supports the maintenance of an autonomous military and administrative apparatus detached from Damascus, and progress in the Turkish–PKK peace track narrows the space for maintaining cross-border armed affiliations.
The issue of ISIS detainees may lead Washington to favor preserving certain security functions performed by the SDF during the transitional phase, including the management and guarding of specific detention facilities. Conversely, the Syrian government is moving toward dismantling the SDF's organizational autonomy without an immediate dissolution of its human infrastructure, absorbing personnel and civil bodies while gradually transferring the instruments of command, funding, training, and armament to the state. The ultimate success of this approach will depend on settling the remaining files, foremost among them the SDF General Command, the Women's Protection Units, internal security organs, and ISIS-related detention facilities.
Accordingly, forming brigades, registering personnel, and integrating civil servants into government bodies will not serve as the definitive benchmark for the success of integration. Rather, success will hinge on the actual transfer of decision-making authority and sovereign files —including prison administration— to state institutions. The persistence of any of these functions under autonomous SDF management risks perpetuating a dual military and security structure, even as organizational and administrative integration advances.