Introduction
The "US–Israeli" military confrontation against Iran, which erupted at dawn on Saturday, February 28, 2026, following extensive airstrikes targeting military and security sites inside Iran, has triggered significant shifts in the regional environment of the Middle East. Tehran retaliated by launching waves of ballistic missiles and drones toward Israel and several US-linked targets across the region, widening the scope of the confrontation and turning it into an open regional crisis casting its shadow over all countries in the region.
Syria assumes particular importance in this confrontation due to its geographic position between the conflicting parties, in addition to the complexities of the transition period the country is undergoing and the fragility of its economic infrastructure following prolonged years of war. Although Syria has not directly engaged in military operations, its location between Iran and Israel has rendered it vulnerable to the military and security repercussions of the war, while the impact of the confrontation has reverberated across its internal political and economic environment.
These repercussions have manifested across multiple levels: from the political arrangements that preceded the outbreak of the war, to the military and security measures taken by Damascus to control its borders and prevent the conflict from spilling over into its territory, through to the economic pressures stemming from supply chain disruptions and surging energy and transport costs in the region. Amid the ongoing regional confrontation and the expansion of its indirect impacts, the importance of analyzing the ramifications of this war on Syria and anticipating its political, military, and economic consequences in the coming period becomes increasingly evident.
First: Political Impacts and Repercussions of the War
The political impacts of the US–Israeli war on Iran can be divided into two phases: impacts that preceded the war, and anticipated subsequent impacts.
1. Pre-War Political Impacts:
The United States prepared the regional theater ahead of launching the war on Iran. Syria was one of the preparatory steps in which the United States sought to ensure the success of its operation by guaranteeing Syria's neutrality and preventing Iran from exploiting any remnants of its presence or influence in Syria to carry out retaliatory operations against Israel or US interests. US preparatory steps took shape through several political impacts prior to the war on two fronts:
• Arranging the internal Syrian political scene: The United States, through its envoy Thomas Brack, sought to broker the January 18 and 29 agreements with the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), securing a ceasefire and the launch of the process to integrate the SDF into the government. This was in addition to resolving the issue of al-Hol camp housing ISIS families, and transferring ISIS detainees to Iraq to prevent chaos in the country. On another front, the United States had also reached a tripartite Suwayda roadmap agreement on September 16, 2025, in partnership with Syria and Jordan, to prevent any escalation that Iran could exploit through Shia or Palestinian factions potentially deployed near the Syrian-Israeli border.
• Arranging the external Syrian political scene: The United States continued to sponsor Syrian-Israeli meetings to reach a security agreement and worked to commit the Israeli Prime Minister to de-escalating hostile operations against Syria, convincing him of their negative consequences for regional security. It also preempted the operation by incorporating Syria into the International Coalition and revoking the terrorist designation of Syrian President Ahmad al-Sharaa, Interior Minister Anas Khattab, and Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham, in order to allow the flow of funds following the decision to lift economic sanctions on Syria.
2. Anticipated Subsequent Political Impacts of the War:
Since 1979, when the Iranian regime came to power following the Shah's rule, this marks the first time Syria has not stood by Iran in its regional wars and aggressions against neighboring Arab states. Across both eras, the Assad family consistently aligned with Iran and participated in the Iran-led "Axis of Resistance," which prompted Syria's persistent US designation as a State Sponsor of Terrorism. This stance is expected to yield significant political impacts, foremost among them the removal of this designation. This would translate into strengthening the legitimacy of the Syrian government, recognizing its political transition steps, upgrading diplomatic exchanges, and lifting remaining financial restrictions arising from this designation as well as curbs on enhancing the capabilities of the Syrian army, particularly in counter-terrorism efforts.
On the Israeli track, increased US understanding is expected regarding the Syrian government's position in its bilateral negotiations with Israel and its demands to return to the 1974 Disengagement Agreement, alongside pressing Israel to make concessions that facilitate reaching a mutually satisfactory security agreement. Regarding internal agreements with the SDF and Suwayda, US support for the Syrian government is expected to increase in extending its control over the entire country, enforcing these agreements, and preventing military clashes with government forces.
Second: Military Impacts and Repercussions of the War
With the outbreak of the "US–Israeli" confrontation against Iran, the Syrian state moved to reinforce its defensive measures along the borders, as part of an assessment of the potential risks associated with the spillover of the war into the Syrian arena. In this context, the Syrian army deployed military reinforcements toward the borders with Iraq and Lebanon to tighten control over the border strip, monitor military movements, and prevent the infiltration of elements linked to Hezbollah or loyalist Syrian elements previously recruited during the years of its military intervention in Syria. This comes in light of recurring attempts to smuggle weapons to Hezbollah through Syrian territory during the period following the fall of the Assad regime.
Despite the wide geographic scope of Iranian strikes across the region, Iranian missile attacks did not target Syrian territory, which can be interpreted as an effort by Tehran to neutralize the Syrian arena and avoid opening an additional front that could push Damascus into direct involvement in the war. However, the party's field movements in border areas—coinciding with the Lebanese government's decision to ban its military activities and obligate it to surrender its weapons to the state—could push Damascus to adopt a forward defense posture in Lebanese areas adjacent to its border. This possibility gains further relevance amid reports of camps in the Hermel region housing remnants of the Assad regime, suspected of being mobilized to stir security unrest inside Syria. In this context, the Syrian government demanded that its Lebanese counterpart extradite around 200 Syrians accused of war crimes residing in Lebanon, reflecting the growing security dimension in bilateral relations.
Furthermore, Syria's geographic location between Iran and Israel has turned the southern part of the country into an arena of indirect interaction between the two sides of the conflict. Debris from Iranian missiles and drones intercepted by Israel fell over areas in Daraa Governorate, coinciding with frequent Israeli warplane flights in Quneitra airspace and an increased Israeli military build-up along the border with Syria.
Internally, Syrian authorities took additional precautionary measures to curb the security repercussions of the war, including tightening entry requirements for Lebanese citizens through land crossings and restricting access to specific categories such as businesspeople and residency holders. This measure aims to minimize transit movement and avert any potential sectarian friction, particularly given the fragile social stability in border areas, as demonstrated by the attack on a bus carrying Syrian families returning from Lebanon in the city of al-Qusayr on the pretext of suspected ties among passengers to the party.
Third: Economic Impacts and Repercussions of the War
The Syrian economy is among the most vulnerable in the region to external shocks, given its heavy reliance on importing basic commodities and its weakened productive capacity following long years of war. Should the US–Israeli confrontation against Iran persist for a longer duration, the disruption of global supply chains and rising transport and energy costs could directly affect Syrian markets, which already suffer from structural imbalances in production, trade, and monetary policy. Some manifestations of this impact have already begun to emerge, through rising food prices since the start of Ramadan, the return of household gas queues, and signs of fuel shortages in certain areas. The most prominent economic repercussions of the regional war on Syria are reflected in several indicators, notably:
• Decline in electricity supply; resulting from a decrease in natural gas volumes imported via Jordan allocated to operating power plants, amid Syria's partial reliance on imported gas to offset weak domestic production and damaged energy infrastructure.
• Increased pressure on the power grid; after parts of the electrical infrastructure sustained damage caused by falling missile debris in Rif Dimashq, knocking a transformer at the al-Utaybah industrial substation out of service.
• Resurgence of severe electricity rationing; caused by disruptions to the Arab Gas Pipeline, which adversely affects the activity of factories and industrial facilities and increases production costs across agriculture, industry, and transport sectors.
• Rising food prices, and the potential exacerbation of inflationary pressures should global oil prices surge to between $100 and $150 per barrel, which could significantly drive up Syria's import bill amid limited financial resources.
• Erosion of household purchasing power, higher poverty and unemployment rates, and mounting social pressure should the war continue; as the Syrian economy has a narrow margin to absorb shocks compared to larger economies, given limited financial resources and weak domestic productive capacity.
• Disruption of civil aviation; due to continued airspace closures and flight suspensions at Damascus International Airport, hampering passenger and air cargo traffic and affecting foreign trade activity.
• Potential for additional demographic pressure; resulting from an influx of Syrian and Lebanese refugees from Lebanon into Syria should the scope of the war widen.
• Surge in maritime shipping costs; driven by navigation disruptions in the Arabian Gulf; Clarksons Research estimates that around 3,200 cargo vessels are anchored in the region, curtailing available shipping capacity and driving up global freight rates.
• Decline in expatriate remittances; if companies in Gulf countries are forced to downsize foreign labor due to slowing economic activity.
• Postponement or reassessment of planned Gulf investments in Syria; owing to heightened political risks and insurance costs in the region.
• Disruption of trade with Jordan; and rising domestic production costs, which could force some small and medium enterprises to scale back operations or shut down entirely.
In light of these challenges, there is a clear need to adopt a proactive economic policy aimed at mitigating the impacts of potential economic shocks. This includes reinforcing strategic reserves of fuel, wheat, and basic foodstuffs, and diversifying import routes and sources, alongside reviewing customs policies to reduce the cost of production inputs and protect local industrial sectors. It is also crucial to tighten market oversight to prevent monopolization and speculation, in addition to developing rapid coordination mechanisms between the government and the private sector to ensure supply chain continuity and prevent limited disruptions from evolving into broad-based crises.
Conclusion
Although the "US–Israeli" war against Iran did not spill over directly into Syrian territory, it has left multifaceted impacts on the political, security, and economic environment in the country.
Politically, regional developments associated with the war contributed to repositioning Syria within regional balances, as Damascus sought to avoid direct involvement in the confrontation between Iran on one side and the United States and Israel on the other. However, it still maintains room for security and military maneuver to protect its borders and counter emerging threats posed by movements of Hezbollah and remnants of the former regime in border areas. This repositioning may enhance the Syrian government's legitimacy and expand its diplomatic and regional room for maneuver.
Militarily, the war prompted Syria to reinforce its defensive measures along the borders in an attempt to prevent the conflict from spilling over into Syrian territory, and to control the movements of armed actors linked to Iran or Hezbollah, at a time when the southern part of the country has become an arena of indirect interaction between Iran and Israel due to falling missile and drone debris and interceptions in Syrian airspace.
Economically, the repercussions appear more delicate given the fragility of the Syrian economy and its heavy dependence on imports, as global supply chain disruptions and surging energy and freight costs drive up inflationary pressures, erode purchasing power, and increase the risks of poverty and unemployment, in addition to the potential decline in remittances and regional investments if the war continues for a longer period.
Consequently, Syria's ability to mitigate the impacts of the war will depend largely on its success in keeping its territory neutral from the regional conflict, alongside adopting proactive economic policies that bolster strategic reserves of essential commodities and reduce the Syrian economy's exposure to external shocks.

