On August 25, 2026, the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) announced their dissolution as an independent military force, following an extended process of talks with the Syrian government and practical measures to integrate their personnel into Syrian military and security institutions. These steps effectively began following the agreement of January 29, 2026, building upon the path initiated by the agreement of March 10, 2025.
During the initial months following the fall of the Assad regime, the SDF held firmly to the demand for self-administration during negotiations with the Syrian government, leveraging a military force comprising thousands of fighters with US backing. The SDF’s stance served as a pretext for other factions that rejected the outcomes of the National Dialogue Conference and the formation of the new government in Syria—most notably the National Guard forces in As-Suwayda Governorate, for whom Druze spiritual leader Hikmat al-Hijri serves as the primary authority.
Al-Hijri, the National Guard, and the administrative council in As-Suwayda—dubbed "Mount Bashan"—had long promoted the idea that Syria's diverse components endorse self-administration because they refuse a monolithic, single-color government. However, the negotiation track pursued by the SDF with the Syrian government, which culminated in the announcement of its dissolution, stripped this argument of its most prominent practical model. It also shifted the spotlight toward As-Suwayda and the National Guard, given that the governorate remains the last major area outside the direct control of the government.
The impact of the SDF’s dissolution on the National Guard is not limited to losing the leverage of an influential Syrian actor; it extends to the political message inherent in the decision. With the retreat of the US umbrella, the SDF's dissolution indicates that Washington no longer insists on maintaining an independent military force or an autonomous administration project outside Syrian state institutions. This conclusion is further reinforced by reports that the US Department of Defense informed the leaders of the Kurdistan Region of Iraq that it does not intend, at present, to renew the security assistance memorandum for the Peshmerga forces after its expiration on September 30, 2026. In other words, there is a broader American orientation toward reducing direct support channels for local forces.
In parallel with this shift, al-Hijri’s pivot toward seeking greater Israeli support can be interpreted as an attempt to compensate for his diminished ability to draw strength from the SDF’s position, thereby preserving room for maneuver vis-à-vis the Syrian government. It was in this context that he made statements asserting that the Druze share creed and ideology with Israel and constitute an integral part of it.
With the SDF declaring its dissolution and its leadership engaging in the integration process within state institutions—and the potential this may later offer for expanding Kurdish political participation—the legitimacy of the state and its institutions will be bolstered. In contrast, the National Guard will face increasing isolation and the loss of part of the political cover afforded by the persistence of the SDF model, effectively reducing it to an insurgent armed group lacking legal and political legitimacy. This is compounded by the continued erosion of its popular standing as a result of al-Hijri's repeated statements regarding ties with Israel, as well as friction between its members and local residents in the city of As-Suwayda, the latest instance of which involved accusations that groups affiliated with the National Guard prevented basic and secondary education students from traveling to centers located in government-controlled areas to sit for make-up examinations.
Overall, it can be said that the fate of the National Guard and its areas of influence is largely tied to the future of relations between the Syrian government and Israel, and whether the two parties reach coherent security understandings. Any understandings that constrain the Israeli role in the south will diminish the National Guard's maneuvering capacity and increase pressure on it to integrate or dissolve; conversely, the continuation of the "Syrian–Israeli" dispute would prolong its survival as a local leverage card, without ensuring its transformation into a stable or recognized entity.