Introduction
On August 13, 2026, Syria and Iraq agreed to establish specialized judicial teams to follow up on the conditions of Syrian prisoners in Iraq and exchange information and documents related to their files. This came during meetings held in Damascus by the President of the Iraqi Supreme Judicial Council, Faiq Zaidan, with Syrian President Ahmad al-Sharaa and Foreign Minister Asaad al-Shaibani, as well as with Syrian Justice Minister Mazhar al-Wais and members of the Syrian Supreme Judicial Council.
The number of Syrian prisoners in Iraq stands at 3245 accused of belonging to ISIS, accounting for more than half of all prisoners transferred from Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) prisons in Syria to Iraq, totaling approximately 5700 prisoners from more than 40 countries, including around 900 prisoners from European, Asian, and Australian countries combined. Among them, for instance, are 10 prisoners from the Netherlands, 9 from the United Kingdom, 4 from Sweden, 3 from France, and 13 from Australia, while Germany accounts for the largest share among Western nations, with 27 prisoners.
The "Syrian–Iraqi" agreement on detainees accused of belonging to ISIS comes days after the UN Security Council’s Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team published its 38th report on ISIS, Al-Qaida, and associated entities. The Security Council had discussed the report on August 5, alongside the UN Secretary-General's semi-annual report on the threat posed by ISIS to international peace and security.
First: Implications of the "Syrian–Iraqi" Agreement
The timing of the "Syrian–Iraqi" agreement on the transfer of ISIS detainees cannot be separated from a series of concurrent security and judicial developments in the region, which have once again brought to the fore the fate of the group's detainees, the responsibility for their detention and prosecution, and the possibility of their repatriation.
Should the work of the bilateral judicial teams lead to the transfer of Syrian detainees back to their country, the agreement could contribute—to easing the security burdens expected to mount on Iraqi authorities, which are concurrently working to disarm militias and confine weapons to state control. This gains added significance with the United States confirming the completion of its military withdrawal from Iraq by the end of next September. Such a withdrawal would place greater responsibility on Iraqi security forces, Peshmerga forces, and Kurdistan Regional security agencies in combating terrorism and securing prisons holding ISIS members, including detainees transferred from Syria in early 2026 after Syrian government forces took control of northeastern areas previously held by the SDF.
This interpretation is reinforced by the agreement coinciding with growing concerns in the Iraqi Kurdistan Region over the potential security fallout of the US withdrawal, which Kurdistan Region President Nechirvan Barzani conveyed to President Ahmad al-Sharaa during his visit to Damascus in early August. The Region’s concerns center on ISIS potentially exploiting the vacuum left by the withdrawal to regroup, especially following the escape of several of its members from SDF prisons and its attempts to re-establish contact with the families and children of its members who left Al-Hol camp and dispersed across various parts of Syria. The Region also fears the potential infiltration of some of these individuals across the Syrian–Iraqi border, over which Syrian government forces have not yet fully secured control.
The Syrian and Iraqi sides appear to have explored ways to address the status of certain Syrian detainees before final verdicts are handed down in Iraq that could hinder their repatriation—particularly death sentences—or necessitate special legal arrangements. This is especially relevant given that the Head of the Judicial Supervision Commission in Iraq, Judge Layth Jabr, clarified concurrently with the Iraqi delegation's visit to Damascus that the prisoner transfer agreement signed between Iraq and Turkey excludes those sentenced to death, such that the penalty is carried out in Iraq, whereas individuals serving other sentences may be transferred to Turkey to serve the remainder of their terms, in accordance with cooperation memoranda and the principle of reciprocity.
The "Syrian–Iraqi" agreement aligns with a regional trend aimed at addressing legal hurdles associated with prisoner transfers or repatriations. The Lebanese Parliament recently decided to abolish the death penalty from national legislation and replace it with life imprisonment. This decision paves the way for Lebanon to receive its nationals detained in Iraq, including those sentenced to death, and also covers Syrians facing capital punishment in Lebanese prisons by commuting their sentences to life imprisonment, potentially paving the way for their transfer to Syria.
The agreement also aligns with international momentum calling for the repatriation of foreign nationals detained over links to ISIS. In his semi-annual report, the UN Secretary-General urged Member States to facilitate the safe, voluntary, and dignified return of their citizens in accordance with international law—a call strongly backed by the United States. This approach provides political and legal cover to move the detainees' file forward, rather than leaving the burden of their detention and prosecution on a limited number of countries.
Ultimately, the timing of the agreement reflects Iraq’s desire to settle the status of Syrian detainees and transfer as many of them as possible before their trials conclude and final sentences are issued. As judicial proceedings advance—especially in cases that may culminate in death sentences—the flexibility for transfer arrangements diminishes, making a comprehensive resolution to the issue far more complex.
Second: Will Syria Agree to Receive Syrian ISIS Prisoners from Iraq?
With the withdrawal of its troops from Iraq by the end of next September, the United States will not leave the file of non-Iraqi ISIS prisoners to the risks arising from potential mismanagement by the Iraqi government or its inability to guard detention facilities, which could lead to the escape of some group members. Therefore, the United States is expected to press all countries with detained nationals to repatriate them, including Syria. It is likely to succeed given the small number of prisoners to be repatriated, whether countries agree to bring them back directly or work to transfer them to third-party intermediary states or locations.
Syria, for its part, will most likely agree under US pressure to receive Syrian prisoners from Iraq and complete their judicial proceedings in Syrian courts. Upon the issuance of verdicts, a portion of the prisoners will have already served their sentences during their detention periods, which may have reached nearly 10 years. This leaves hundreds of prisoners who will receive lengthy sentences, life imprisonment, or the death penalty if capital punishment remains in force in Syria and is not abolished as occurred in Lebanon.
However, Syria’s anticipated consent does not mean the repatriation process will be free of risks, given the continued fragility of the security situation, the new government's challenges in establishing a unified military structure, preventing the infiltration of terrorist elements into security services, and asserting effective control across all Syrian territory. This is in line with UN reports indicating that ISIS retains around 3,000 fighters in the Syrian–Iraqi area, mostly based in Syria, where its desert (Badia) region remains of strategic importance to the group.
These risks are compounded by the group shifting toward building networks across various Syrian governorates and planting sleeper cells in urban centers, including Damascus. At the same time, the government’s implementation of a plan to integrate at least 3,500 foreign fighters into the new armed forces adds another challenge to the process of building unified, disciplined military and security structures, heightening the sensitivity of any matter relating to ISIS members and their potential networks.
Meanwhile, repatriating Syrian prisoners from Iraq would impose additional security, judicial, and political burdens on Damascus. These begin with providing detention centers capable of preventing escapes or jailbreak attempts, and extend to holding trials and enforcing sentences. Furthermore, ISIS could exploit the transfer of its members to Syria to launch retaliatory operations in response to their prosecution, or carry out attacks targeting prisons to free them.
These challenges may escalate if the United States reassigns part of the ISIS detainees file to the SDF, thereby dividing responsibility between the Syrian government and the SDF and further complicating security and judicial coordination between them. The resulting pressures could also place additional strain on Syrian military and security structures that are still undergoing integration, raising the likelihood of internal friction or divisions.
Overall, Syria is expected in principle to agree to receive its detained citizens from Iraq under US pressure. However, this agreement will not bring closure to the issue so much as shift the responsibility for detaining, prosecuting, and securing these prisoners from Iraq to Syria, carrying with it long-term security risks and legal and political burdens.
Third: Responsibility for Guarding Syrian Prisoners Returned from Iraq
With Syria’s expected agreement to repatriate its detained citizens from Iraq, the question will arise as to where they will be held and which entity will guard them and manage their detention facilities. The most probable option that the United States may push for is returning them to detention centers in northeastern Syria, particularly prisons previously run by the SDF, four of which remain under its control according to developments in implementing the integration agreement with the Syrian government.
These facilities include the Sina'a Prison in the Ghuwayran neighborhood of Hasakah, Derik Prison in Al-Malikiyah, Rmelan Prison, and Nafkar Prison in Qamishli. In contrast, four other prisons have slipped from SDF control: Raqqa Prison, Al-Kasrah Prison in the western Deir ez-Zor countryside, Al-Shaddadi Prison, and Camp Al-Bulghar in Al-Shaddadi in the southern Hasakah countryside.
The United States is also expected to push for keeping management and guarding duties assigned to the SDF, which currently exercises them in practice, with direct oversight and support from the Global Coalition against Daesh—comprising 90 partner countries and entities, which Syria joined several months ago. For the United States, this arrangement could achieve two main objectives:
● Ensuring prison security: The United States considers the SDF to have proven its effectiveness as a local partner of the Global Coalition against ISIS, possessing personnel highly trained in prison security and administration. Conversely, Washington may harbor reservations about government forces fully assuming this responsibility, given fears that elements within them might sympathize with some detainees or facilitate escapes. These concerns are reinforced by the escape of certain detainees and loss of control that accompanied the fall of the other four prisons from SDF control.
● Maintaining a security rationale for the SDF's continuation within a limited military and security structure: Entrusting the SDF with prison security and management allows it to maintain its presence as a force with a recognized security function, despite Syrian government efforts toward its full integration into state institutions under signed bilateral agreements. This option could also allow direct US funding to continue flowing to the SDF under the rubric of guarding ISIS detainees and managing their prisons, outside Syrian government institutions. Furthermore, sustaining this mission gives the United States leverage over relations between Damascus and the SDF, and pressure on Damascus regarding internal files and regional security issues. It also leaves the SDF as a card Washington can leverage in managing its disputes with Turkey over regional security files and the future of the military and security architecture in northeastern Syria.
Determining the entity responsible for guarding prisoners returning from Iraq extends beyond technical and security dimensions; it is also linked to the future of the SDF and its position within Syrian state institutions. Prison management could become a function that justifies preserving its military and security structure and funding—whether independently or in an institutionalized manner, even if with a security function within state institutions if integration proceeds—thereby granting the United States lasting influence in relations among Damascus, the SDF, and Turkey.
Conclusion
The Syrian government will likely agree to receive Syrian prisoners held in Iraqi detention facilities as part of a US plan and pressure exerted on all countries with nationals detained in Iraq, coinciding with the completion of the US military withdrawal by the end of next September. However, transferring these prisoners to Syria will place additional security, judicial, and political burdens on the government regarding securing their detention facilities, putting them on trial, and preventing jailbreaks or attacks targeting the prisons to which they are moved.
Despite these burdens, the Syrian government should insist that sovereign, security, and judicial authority over the file remains under state institutions, while leveraging technical and security support from the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS. Entrusting prison management or security to the SDF in any form—whether independently or institutionalized within state organs—must be avoided, so that the issue does not become a pretext to perpetuate its separate structure from state institutions or grant it an institutionalized role within them.
This requires distributing prisoners across several government-run, high-security prisons in various regions across the country, rather than confining them to facilities in northeastern Syria, where SDF integration procedures are not yet complete and security and administrative responsibilities remain subject to negotiation. This approach would mitigate the risks of concentrating detainees in a single region and prevent their file from being exploited as leverage over the SDF integration process or relations between the Syrian government and the United States.