Since the 1950s, Syria has witnessed a series of legislative measures that enabled successive governments to expand their control over certain private properties of individuals. The first milestone began with the Agrarian Reform Law No. 161 of 1958, under which the United Arab Republic government set limits on agricultural land ownership.
The second milestone came with Hafez al-Assad’s rise to power and the issuance of Expropriation Law No. 20 of 1974, which permitted the appropriation of zoned land for public utilities. This was followed by the third milestone, Urban Expansion Law No. 60 of 1979, which allowed the expropriation of land to meet residential and urban development needs. The fourth milestone followed with Legislative Decree No. 20 of 1983, granting public authorities sweeping powers in property expropriation and compensation assessment.
Expropriation policies continued under Bashar al-Assad, escalating with the enactment of Law No. 26 of 2000, which marked the fifth milestone in the expropriation trajectory. Serving as an updated version of the 1979 Expropriation Law, it expanded the state's powers to acquire land under the pretexts of development and urban expansion. It granted local authorities and municipal councils the right to seize land without fair compensation, leaving real estate ownership in Syria subject to administrative and security decisions.
The sixth milestone was marked by Law No. 15 of 2008, which granted the General Authority for Real Estate Development and Investment the authority to propose the expropriation of private properties or parts thereof, as well as the mandate to demolish, rebuild, rehabilitate, and redevelop residential areas. This law had disastrous consequences for a broad segment of Syrians who rose against the Assad regime. Because it applied to properties both within and outside master zoning plans, it facilitated forgery and fraudulent sales in zoned areas by exploiting the absence of original owners living in displacement and refugee camps; thus, these laws turned into punitive political tools after 2011.
The seventh milestone came with Decree No. 66 of 2012, which established two redevelopment zones in the dissident neighborhoods of Mazzeh and Kafr Sousa in Damascus. This decree complemented the military campaigns waged by the Assad regime—during which it devastated towns such as Daraya and Moadamiyat al-Sham—ultimately punishing opposition neighborhoods in Kafr Sousa and the Mazzeh Orchards (Basateen al-Mazzeh) and displacing their residents. The practical implementation of Decree 66 demonstrated that urban planning was not a neutral technical process, but rather a multifaceted mechanism for dispossession and the reconfiguration of urban space in favor of luxury investment projects at the expense of marginalizing original inhabitants.
This was followed by the eighth milestone, Legislative Decree No. 63 of 2012, which provided for freezing the assets of individuals pending investigation on terrorism suspicions solely upon a reasoned request from security agencies. Deliberately formulated in broad terms, it enabled the seizure of movable and immovable property of any individual without clear standards of suspicion or procedural safeguards for review, appeal, or judicial referral. This entrenched a systematic violation of the principle of judicial exclusivity over property restrictions, as the executive branch assumed judicial authorities without constitutional mandate or procedural guarantees.
The Assad regime concluded this expropriation trajectory with the ninth and historically most egregious milestone: the enactment of Law No. 10 of 2018. The law enabled the creation of new redevelopment zones and served as a means to dispossess property and strip citizens—particularly the displaced, internally displaced persons, and refugees—of their rights. It stood as a formidable barrier hindering the return of Syrians to their homes until December 8, 2024, and the fall of the Assad regime. With its collapse, hope was restored to property owners affected by confiscation and arbitrary expropriation policies, turning this historical issue into a major testing ground for governance principles and property justice in post-liberation Syria.
On the ground, with the return of refugees and displaced persons, expropriation and real estate planning laws have emerged as prominent legal and social challenges. Ensuring property justice constitutes the true key to the stability of returnees after years of displacement. The failure to address this matter has fueled current public protests, as landowners feel their properties were previously seized by force under the guise of public utility only to be handed over today to investors and war profiteers—especially given that compensation was meager and entirely divorced from current market values. The governmental stance has further provoked local residents, with the General Housing Establishment defending these projects by asserting that expropriation occurred within legal frameworks, without acknowledging the necessity of fair compensation.
Accordingly, continuing to disregard the demands of landowners could trigger further escalation amid growing societal support for sit-ins demanding justice for residents and the restitution of rights to their legitimate owners. This is exacerbated by deep-seated mistrust in public institutions, which has mounted following a series of decisions raising electricity and fuel prices while neglecting pressing domestic livelihood issues. The nature of this matter indicates that resolving it will require a legal, participatory track between landowners and government institutions.

