Since the fall of the Assad regime on 8 December 2024, southern Syria has undergone a sweeping military and security transformation, as Israel capitalized on the security vacuum and shift in the balance of power to push into the demilitarized buffer zone established under the 1974 Disengagement Agreement under United Nations supervision, subsequently advancing beyond it at several locations in the Quneitra countryside.
In the ensuing months, Israel established a network of permanent military bases and outposts extending from the summit of Mount Hermon in the north to the Yarmouk Basin in the south. These sites currently number 11 military bases and outposts, most of which are concentrated in Quneitra Governorate, extending north toward Rif Dimashq at the Mount Hermon and Al-Tulul al-Humr sites, and south toward Daraa Governorate at the Al-Jazira barracks in the Yarmouk Basin, alongside two adjacent bases near Majdal Shams that predated the fall of the Assad regime.
Israel reinforced these bases with infrastructure including new logistical roads, fortifications, earthen berms, watchtowers, gates, iron fences, and living quarters equipped for long-term stays, indicating that most have evolved from temporary deployment points into semi-permanent operational sites used to control high ground, strategic roads, and corridors, and to monitor movements across southern Syria.
Most of the Israeli bases in Syria were established between 8 December 2024 and early March 2025, during the initial months following the fall of the Assad regime and the ascent to power of the Syrian opposition led by Hayat Tahrir al-Sham.
The Israeli bases are distributed across the summit of Mount Hermon in Rif Dimashq; the Al-Tulul al-Humr base west of Beit Jinn and north of Hader; a base in Qurs al-Nafl within the village of Ayn al-Tina northwest of Hader; a base in the Jubata al-Khashab nature reserve; another base northeast of the town of Al-Hamidiyah; a base inside the destroyed city of Quneitra; the Al-Adnaniyah base near Al-Mantara Dam east of Al-Qahtaniyah; the Tal Ahmar base southwest of the town of Kudnah; two sites near Majdal Shams in the central area between it and Hader; and the Al-Jazira barracks west of the town of Maariyah in Daraa.
These bases are positioned on commanding heights and hills, near dams, and along natural corridors and forests, providing Israel with broad control and deep surveillance capabilities toward Damascus and the Syrian interior, along with logistical links to the occupied Golan. These sites were chosen to dominate the access routes to the Golan, monitor any military or civilian movements, isolate villages, and control water resources and agricultural lands through bulldozing and fortification.
The majority of Israeli bases are located within or along the perimeter of the buffer zone, such as Jubata al-Khashab, Al-Hamidiyah, parts of destroyed Quneitra, and sites near Hader. Conversely, certain sites cross the Bravo Line[1] eastward by hundreds of meters to several kilometers into Syrian territory, as in Tal Ahmar southwest of Kudnah, in addition to expansions toward Al-Mantara Dam and the Yarmouk Basin. Some bases are located hundreds of meters, and at most one to two kilometers, beyond the buffer zone, while the overall line of control remains within or directly adjacent to it, with Israeli forces conducting regular incursions that reach depths of 10 to 16 km at times.
The bases provide Israel with launchpads for daily security operations and limited strikes. From late 2024 through mid-2026, Israel utilized them for daily or near-daily patrols and sweep operations, incursions and raids on villages and homes, and the erection of temporary checkpoints and yellow gates restricting civilian movement, in addition to carrying out arrests, searches, land leveling, and house demolitions. This has included demolishing homes in Al-Hamidiyah and clearing sections of woodland in Jubata al-Khashab, alongside surveillance, intelligence gathering, and the capability to respond rapidly to any potential threat.
Base equipment includes defensive fortifications, armored vehicles, logistical roads, and, in some cases, helipads, rendering them prepared for defense as well as limited offensive combat operations, rather than functioning merely as static defensive positions. These bases are expected to continue serving as an advanced security perimeter aimed at keeping the area adjacent to the border free of any Syrian military presence and curbing civilian concentrations there, with the potential to serve as launchpads for deeper operations or for expanding deployments and establishing additional positions inside Syrian territory.
The Mount Hermon outpost currently represents one of the most strategically significant sites for Israel at the regional level. Its geographic vantage point enables Israel to expand its surveillance and control not only toward Syria, but also north of the Litani River in Lebanon all the way to the Mediterranean Sea. This enhances its ability to monitor southern Lebanon and extend the reach of its firepower and military leverage there; Israel may also view this area as a strategic military foothold to be leveraged over the medium and long terms within its regional security and military calculations.
The Syrian government consistently demands a complete Israeli withdrawal from the bases it established and a return to the implementation of the 1974 Agreement, whether through US-mediated negotiating rounds or via submissions by Syria's representative to the UN Security Council. However, on-the-ground indicators—namely ongoing, near-daily Israeli incursions, arrests of civilians, and the construction of fortifications, alongside official Israeli statements—point to the likelihood of this presence persisting indefinitely.
In contrast, Israel stipulates that there must be no Syrian government military or security presence south of Damascus, while seeking to secure security guarantees by pressuring the Syrian government to promptly sign a US-supervised security agreement, maintaining that the previous agreements became null and void following the fall of the Assad regime.
The prospects of a complete Israeli withdrawal from the bases it established in Syria appear slim in the near term, particularly given the ongoing construction of fortifications and infrastructure. Meanwhile, any expansion or increase in the number of bases is expected to occur primarily through reinforcing existing positions or establishing new outposts should Israel perceive a threat or seek to step up pressure on the Syrian government. Nevertheless, there currently appears to be no inclination toward major expansion given the associated costs; rather, Israel is moving toward consolidating its control over the existing network of bases and enhancing their capabilities.
The Israeli bases in southern Syria do not merely represent temporary border deployment points; they form an interconnected military network that has reshaped the security reality on which the 1974 Disengagement Agreement was founded. Under this new reality, Israel has turned the buffer zone—along with limited areas to its east—into a zone of de facto control providing early warning, surveillance, and intelligence gathering, as well as launch points for patrols, incursions, and limited operations inside Syrian territory.
The Israeli military deployment has had direct repercussions on local residents in southern Syria: civilian movement has been restricted, and some residents have lost homes and agricultural lands amid expanding bulldozing and fortification works, turning security tensions into a daily reality across several villages in Quneitra, rural Daraa, and Rif Dimashq. Israel aims to leverage this military presence as ongoing bargaining leverage against the Syrian government in any forthcoming security negotiations.
Ultimately, the future of the Israeli bases does not appear to hinge on battlefield considerations alone; it will remain tied to the course of negotiations between Damascus and Tel Aviv and the nature of the security guarantees that any future settlement might entail. Amid continued fortification, persistent incursions, and the absence of a new agreement, the likelihood of a full withdrawal remains slim in the near term, with Israel expected to focus on consolidating and enhancing its existing network of bases rather than significantly expanding it.
[1] The Bravo Line represents the eastern boundary of the Area of Separation (buffer zone) in the Golan Heights under the 1974 Disengagement Agreement between Syria and Israel. It extends within Syrian territory, where Syrian military forces are prohibited from crossing westward into the Area of Separation, while restrictions are placed on military forces and armaments up to a distance of 25 kilometers east of this line.