Introduction
Israel relied on the "Campaign Between Wars" strategy in targeting sites belonging to the Assad regime, Iranian militias, and Lebanese Hezbollah. It began its ground incursions into Syria in mid-2022, erecting berms and establishing tank and artillery positions. These installations indicated that it was preparing a staging ground for a subsequent offensive, or that it did not intend to withdraw from the area later.
With the fall of the regime on 8 December 2024, Israel launched the largest operation in its history in Syria under the name "Arrow of Bashan," in which it targeted Syria's strategic military infrastructure. This operation marked a turning point in its operations against the Syrian state after destroying its strategic defense capabilities (air force and air defense). It subsequently launched ground incursions that resulted in taking control of 665 square kilometers and establishing 9 interchangeable, predominantly logistical military sites.
Israeli military sites are distributed across the areas it seized in the Quneitra and Daraa governorates: a base north of the town of Hader, a base at Tal Ahmar east of Hader, a base in Jubata al-Khashab, a base in the destroyed city of Quneitra, a base in the vicinity of the village of al-Hamidiyah, a base west of the al-Mantarah Dam, a base in the village of al-Adnaniyah, a base at Eastern Tal Ahmar, and the al-Jazira base in the far southern Quneitra countryside and western Daraa countryside.
Despite repeated assurances from the Syrian government that it does not intend to pose any threat to Israel and that its priority is focused on rebuilding Syria, Israel has continued executing military and security operations inside Syrian territory, without regard to its engagement in indirect negotiations with Syria under US sponsorship, even if these negotiations have not yielded tangible results to date.
First: Forms of Israeli Operations in Syria
1. Ground Incursions:
Israeli forces conduct near-daily ground incursions extending along the border strip with the occupied Golan, advancing into Syrian territory across vast areas in the southern and northern Quneitra countrysides, reaching the Yarmouk Basin in western Daraa countryside.
These incursions aim to establish an undeclared buffer zone by bulldozing agricultural lands in the areas of Jubata al-Khashab, Kudnah, and al-Rafid in Quneitra Governorate, and particularly in the villages of western Daraa countryside and the Yarmouk Basin, as well as destroying infrastructure and military sites through repeated strikes. This prevents civilians from accessing their agricultural lands and imposes restrictions on their movement, alongside frequent interrogations and temporary checkpoints.
Israeli incursions are also characterized by their expanding scope to include villages, agricultural roads, grazing areas, and civilian populations, in addition to the destruction of civilian and historical facilities. For instance, Israeli forces demolished 15 homes in the village of al-Hamidiyah and blew up the historic Dagestani Mosque, the museum building, the courthouse, Cinema al-Andalus, and the historic Stone Hospital [1] .
2. Air Sorties:
Alongside ground incursions, the Israeli army conducts air sorties over the Quneitra and Daraa governorates, during which warplanes have sprayed chemical herbicides to clear vegetation, under the pretext of preventing armed groups from using it as camouflage to advance toward the border fence.
These operations resulted in the formation of a defoliated strip up to 80 meters wide and damaged approximately 2,500 dunums of agricultural land designated for grazing and cultivated with fruit trees and crops, contributing to exposing the area militarily and altering its geographical features.
3. Patrols and Raids:
The Israeli army carries out ongoing arrests of Syrian citizens, whether through field detentions during patrols near the border strip—including shepherds and civilians engaged in daily livelihood activities—or through routine raids targeting the homes of specific individuals and taking them into occupied territory.
The number of abductees from the area held in Israeli prisons reached 46 individuals, most of whom do not belong to any political or military entity and were not engaged in activities that could justify their detention, according to accounts from their families. The families have called on the Syrian government to include their cases in any future negotiations with Israel, which claims that some detainees are linked to weapons possession or to operating within Iran-affiliated networks in the area.
4. Support for Drug Smuggling:
Suspicions exist regarding Israeli support for, or exploitation of, drug trafficking networks in southern Syria, consistent with its policies aimed at undermining security stability on the Syrian-Jordanian border and pressuring Amman, which consistently affirms its support for Syria's territorial integrity and sovereignty.
The security and military operation carried out by Jordan at dawn on 3 May 2026 on its northern border, inside Syrian territory and in coordination with the Syrian government, revealed aspects of the nature of these networks after targeting factories and warehouses linked to smuggling operations. Official Jordanian statements also showed the use of advanced technologies, including drones, airborne balloons, and encrypted communications to smuggle highly hazardous materials—capabilities exceeding the traditional nature of local smuggling gangs.
Second: Factors Influencing Negotiations with Israel
Alongside military expansion, the Israeli government is working to reshape the demographic and economic reality in the region. On 17 April 2026, it approved a $334 million plan to expand the Katzrin settlement and transform it into the first city in the Golan, bringing in approximately 3,000 Israeli families by 2030.
These steps have triggered mounting UN and international warnings, focusing on the continued occupation of the Syrian Golan and the repercussions of Israeli operations in southern Syria on civilians and their livelihoods, especially in agricultural areas, amid reports of raids, detentions, and movement restrictions.
Despite international objections and US-sponsored regional and international mediation efforts to establish stability, Israel has shown no genuine commitment to de-escalating its operations. The Paris Agreement between the two sides in January 2026 [2]—which pertained to working toward permanent security and stability arrangements—was not reflected in its conduct on the ground for multiple reasons, most notably:
1. The Rise of the Far Right and Expansionist Policies:
Current Israeli policies are influenced by the rise of nationalist and religious right-wing currents within the government led by Benjamin Netanyahu. These factions adopt more hardline approaches toward security, border issues, and settlement expansion, and reject concessions related to withdrawal or easing military control.
Amid his internal political and judicial crises, Netanyahu appears to be seeking to cement his image as a leader—promoting himself as one of the kings of Israel—capable of achieving strategic and historic gains for Israel [3], prompting his government to adopt policies more inclined toward escalation and reshaping facts on the ground in border areas.
2. Absence of Effective International Pressure on Israel:
Israel approaches the current international situation as exerting insufficient pressure to push it toward reaching a security or political agreement with Syria. This appears to grant it broad leeway to continue its military operations in Syria—and the region in general—and raise the ceiling of its security demands.
Israeli security demands include demilitarizing vast areas of southern Syria up to the outskirts of Damascus, preventing any long-term Turkish military presence inside the country, and seeking to link any future understandings with Syria to broader regional shifts, particularly regarding the fate of Hezbollah and the status of the border with Lebanon.
3. Persistent Israeli Mistrust of Syrian Governance:
The Israeli government continues to view the new Syrian authority with mistrust, despite repeated messages affirming Damascus's reluctance to enter into a confrontation with Israel, due to the nature of the political discourse issued by the government, as well as its ideological background; Israel views the new government as Islamist and jihadist.
Indications of Israeli apprehension emerged in several positions taken by President Ahmad al-Sharaa, including his remarks following the Suwayda events in July 2025 stating that Israel "does not cease sowing discord and conflict," and his warning that wars could slide into uncontrollable outcomes. In addition, during the extraordinary Doha Summit in September 2025, he called for a more effective Arab and Islamic stance toward Israeli attacks, before later calling for joint Arab coordination to address the repercussions of the war on Iran.
Israel treats these stances as indicators that Syrian discourse still retains a confrontational tone toward it, even if Damascus practically avoids engaging in direct confrontation.
4. Military and Security Cooperation Between Syria and Turkey:
Israel views with concern the growing coordination and cooperation between Damascus and Ankara, particularly in the military and security fields, in light of Turkish efforts to contribute to rebuilding, training, and arming the new Syrian army. Turkey was among the first countries to appoint a military attaché in Damascus and is working to conclude defense cooperation agreements with the Syrian government.
Within Israeli security circles, this rapprochement is viewed as an additional challenge to Tel Aviv, amid continued mistrust of the new government and fears that Turkish support will lead to building a Syrian military force closely aligned with it. Israel also fears that this trajectory could, in the long run, foster a security environment similar to the threats it faced on other fronts, chief among them the attacks of 7 October 2023.
Third: Projected Scenarios
With ongoing Israeli military operations in Syria, the far right retaining its hold on decision-making in Tel Aviv, and the impact of regional developments—particularly the war on Iran—several potential scenarios can be envisioned for the fate of southern Syria, most notably:
1. Continuation of Israeli Incursions and Operations:
Israel is likely to continue its incursions and military pressure in southern Syria, given its approach to the northern front as a single security sphere encompassing Lebanon and Syria, and the interconnectedness of issues such as the Shebaa Farms and Kfar Shouba Hills with the Syrian-Lebanese border. This means Israel views any final arrangements in these areas as requiring clear Syrian-Lebanese understandings, at a time when it still considers the Shebaa Farms part of the occupied Golan.
2. Integrating Southern Syria into the "Three Southern Fronts" Approach:
Israel could move toward dealing with southern Syria under a security and military approach similar to what is occurring in Gaza and southern Lebanon, based on expanding territorial control, degrading the local environment, and imposing long-term facts on the ground, in tandem with settlement and economic projects in the occupied Golan, including the expansion of the Katzrin settlement and wind turbine projects in Golan villages. This reflects Netanyahu's inclination to ensure border areas remain under security control even after current waves of escalation end [4] .
3. Transforming Southern Syria into an International Security and Economic Zone:
US and regional mediation could drive limited security understandings between Syria and Israel based on containing escalation in exchange for new field arrangements in southern Syria, including reducing the military presence near the border and strengthening security oversight in exchange for curbing Israeli incursions and strikes. In return, Israel might seek to leverage this track to establish realities linked to security, borders, water, and energy in the Eastern Mediterranean, transforming southern Syria into a zone with special security and economic arrangements that enjoy direct US involvement to prevent sliding into open confrontation, by establishing a large US base in the Mount Hermon area to reassure all parties.
4. Descent into Escalation and Open Confrontation:
The continuation of Israeli operations inside Syrian territory, along with the targeting of farmers, the imposition of restrictions on the movement of residents, and preventing them from accessing their lands, could lead to growing local resentment and the emergence of limited forms of resistance in the region. Israeli expansion could also prompt regional powers, foremost Turkey, to increase their support for the Syrian government, viewing this expansion as a direct threat to their interests and regional influence; however, this remains contingent on the faltering of the negotiation track and Syria's inability to convince regional and international powers to neutralize it from the conflict in the region.
Conclusion
The Syrian government entered into open negotiations with Israel regarding its military incursions and control over Syrian territory, based on clear demands centered on withdrawal to the borders of 8 December and affirming that Syrian sovereignty is non-negotiable. However, Israel has continued its military and security operations, in a manner contrary to international law, the path of regional de-escalation, and the growing Syrian-US rapprochement.
Nevertheless, the Syrian government is working to contain Israeli escalation by relying on two primary factors: one relates to the US approach to the region, particularly the Donald Trump administration's tendency toward reducing conflict flashpoints and transforming them into more stable and economically integrated spaces; the other relates to the domestic political situation in Israel and the potential decline of far-right influence following the upcoming Israeli elections in November 2026. In this context, political and security voices have emerged within Israel calling for curbing military operations not tied to clear strategic objectives in Syria, pushing instead toward long-term political and security arrangements under US sponsorship that achieve Israeli security interests without sliding into open confrontation or prolonged attrition in southern Syria.
[1] The Israeli Occupation Continues to Erase Old Quneitra, Al-Modon, 24/04/2026, Link .
[2] The Paris Agreement included the establishment of a joint mechanism to facilitate immediate and continuous coordination in the following areas: intelligence sharing, military de-escalation, diplomatic engagement, and exploring commercial opportunities.
[3] Interview conducted by the researcher with Khaled Khalil, expert on Syrian-Israeli relations, on 20/05/2026.
[4] The "Three Souths" Project: Is Israel Imposing a "Border Empire"? Al Jazeera Net, 03/05/2026, Link

