The process of dismantling the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) has entered a phase that appears set to have a greater impact on Syria than the period following the party's announcement of its self-dissolution and the cessation of armed action in May 2025. On September 23, 2026, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and the Iraqi Prime Minister agreed to work toward fully extending Iraqi state sovereignty over Sinjar and ending the presence of illegal foreign armed elements there. This came after the establishment of a coordination mechanism between Ankara, Baghdad, Erbil, and Sulaymaniyah to follow up on the party's disarmament.
This coincides with the announcement of the completion of the integration of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) into Syrian state institutions at the end of August. The agreement essentially included the removal of non-Syrian leaders and elements affiliated with the PKK from Syrian territory. However, the fate of these elements remains unknown and is one of the most complex issues. On September 3, the Turkish Ministry of National Defense denied reports claiming that foreign elements associated with the SDF had moved from Syria to Turkey.
Tightening coordination between Turkey, Iraq, and the Kurdistan Region regarding the PKK would shrink the regional environment that its networks have exploited over recent years, particularly the ability of its cadres to move between northern Iraq and northeastern Syria.
This acquires additional significance for Damascus following the dissolution of the SDF. The remaining groups or cadres organizationally or ideologically linked to the PKK outside the integration process, such as the "Revolutionary Youth" organization, could transform into discrete networks capable of disrupting the new arrangements or reproducing their activities in different forms. In this context, the legal arrangements associated with the "Terror-Free Turkey" track could be utilized to allow the departure of Turkish elements present in Syria who meet its criteria, especially since previous agreements between Damascus and the SDF included ending the presence of non-Syrian elements and structures associated with the PKK.
Turkish-Iraqi coordination also provides Damascus with an opportunity to address this issue within a regional framework rather than having it turn into an isolated Syrian problem, especially regarding non-Syrian elements not covered by return or settlement arrangements who may seek to remain in Syria or re-establish their networks there. Consequently, one of Damascus’s objectives in this coordination is to prevent Syrian territory from becoming a haven for elements unable to remain in Iraq or return to Turkey, making the resolution of these elements' fate a vital component of completing the dismantling of the party's regional structure.
Meanwhile, the success of the Turkish track will weaken the network of political and organizational influence that the PKK has built over decades within Kurdish communities in the region, including Syria. This would open up greater space for other Kurdish parties and forces, especially those in Syria, to rebuild their presence away from the organizational and military dominance previously enjoyed by PKK-affiliated forces. However, this does not mean an automatic shift of influence to traditional Kurdish parties, many of which still have a limited presence within Syrian Kurdish society despite their recent increase in political and media activity.
The primary challenge remains that the PKK's influence in Syria and the region was not built on arms alone; it also rested on an ideology and social, political, and organizational networks accumulated over decades. Therefore, ending its military structure may reduce its mobility and influence, but it does not necessarily mean the end of its presence within the environments in which it operated, particularly Syria. Some forms of this presence may shift from direct military and organizational activity to civil, political, and cultural spheres, especially if other Kurdish forces fail to offer political frameworks better suited to represent local demands.
Syria currently appears to be part of the next regional phase in the process of dismantling the PKK. After the operation focused on Turkey and Iraq, the dissolution of the SDF as an independent military force and the completion of its integration into state institutions eliminated the most significant military structure that Ankara historically associated with the party inside Syria. However, the success of this track for Syria will not depend solely on the departure of foreign elements or the termination of military structures; rather, it will hinge on the ability of the state and Kurdish political forces to fill the vacuum left by the retreat of the previous organizational apparatus. Thus, the most significant medium-term impact of this process may well be the reshaping of the Kurdish political sphere in Syria.