Analytical Report

A Roadmap for Financial and Banking Compliance in Syria

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A Roadmap for Financial and Banking Compliance in Syria
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Introduction

In 2026, the Syrian financial and banking sector is witnessing an accelerating trajectory toward reconnecting with the international financial system. Beyond lifting sanctions and restoring payment and transfer channels, however, this requires building a financial and banking architecture capable of complying with international standards. Accordingly, the Syrian roadmap in this area can be framed across six interconnected phases, beginning with the removal of legal restrictions, progressing through gap diagnostics, building compliance systems, and banking reform, followed by the restoration of international banking relationships, and culminating in testing the effectiveness of this framework in the upcoming mutual evaluation.

Syrian financial and banking moves come in the wake of international reviews and extensive amendments to sanctions regulations. During 2025 and 2026, the United States dismantled a broad part of the sanctions architecture that had constrained the Syrian economy for years and removed Syria's designation from the State Sponsors of Terrorism list. This eliminated a significant portion of the legal and political obstacles hindering the restoration of external financial relations, yet it did not automatically lead to the normalization of banking relations.

In parallel, efforts began to restore the infrastructure that practically enables external transactions—ranging from reconnecting the Central Bank of Syria to the SWIFT network and resuming select remittances, to re-linking the Syrian payments system to global networks, initiating the acceptance of international cards within Syria, and taking steps regarding the Central Bank of Syria's overseas accounts.

In May 2026, the Central Bank of Syria permitted licensed local banks and payment companies to operate with global payment networks. By August, the process had transitioned from technical testing to the actual operation of international payment acceptance within Syria.

However, this phase represents merely an entry point to the roadmap. Lifting sanctions allows for potential engagement, the SWIFT network provides a means of communication, and card networks offer payment channels; yet none of these, on their own, guarantees the willingness of foreign banks to deal with Syrian institutions.

At present, Syria appears to be in a gray zone. The international banking system does not operate on the logic of political statements, despite their significance. Correspondent banks weigh modest profits from an emerging market against potential costs that may include fines, regulatory scrutiny, and reputational risks; in such circumstances, de-risking and refraining from engagement become rational administrative decisions. Consequently, the roadmap shifts from removing external barriers to the imperative of addressing internal obstacles within the Syrian financial and banking sector itself.

Second: Diagnosing Financial and Banking Gaps

In April 2026, the Syrian Ministry of Finance, the Qatar Fund for Development, and global consulting firm Oliver Wyman signed an agreement for a project to assess Syria's financial and banking sector. The project aims to evaluate both the banking and non-banking financial sectors and formulate a roadmap and action plan for their development. The Qatar Fund for Development is financing the project with support from the U.S. Department of the Treasury and the World Bank.

This assessment constituted the diagnostic step in the reform roadmap. Moving toward restructuring the sector or urging international banks to resume business with it would be difficult without first identifying gaps in governance, capitalization, risk management, supervision, compliance, and technical infrastructure.

Initial assessments of state-owned banks identified operational and structural shortcomings in a sector that remains small and limited in scale, comprising six public banks alongside private institutions.

The Oliver Wyman team's review of state-owned banks also focused on governance, operations, deposits, liquidity, risks, loans, credit facilities, collateral, and the extent of adherence to international accounting standards.

Along the same path, the World Bank approved a $100 million project in August 2026 to modernize the Syrian financial sector. This includes upgrading financial and banking infrastructure, conducting independent asset quality reviews for public and private banks, enhancing risk-based supervision, and building the capacity of the Central Bank of Syria and the Financial Intelligence Unit.

Overall, reforming the Syrian banking sector begins with addressing technical and institutional gaps in parallel, and strengthening its capacity for risk management, disclosure, oversight, and safeguarding the integrity of the financial system—laying the groundwork for establishing a more effective compliance architecture.

Third: Building the Financial Compliance System

Following the gap diagnosis comes the stage most closely tied to the core of this roadmap: building a compliance architecture that goes beyond merely issuing laws and directives, operating in a manner whose effectiveness can be measured and verified by international financial institutions.

Banking compliance in Syria has become a prerequisite for maintaining the sector's reintegration into the international financial system. This obligates banks to apply more rigorous supervisory measures to domestic transactions and conduct broader verification regarding the nature of operations and sources of funds.

Key compliance requirements include: anti-money laundering and countering the financing of terrorism (AML/CFT), implementing customer due diligence regarding identity, source of funds, and nature of business, and identifying ultimate beneficial owners, alongside transaction monitoring, reporting suspicious activities, and enhanced due diligence for politically exposed persons (PEPs). This complexity does not represent an administrative burden so much as an indispensable cost to preserve international banking channels.

In other words, what is required is not simply having an internal compliance file within each bank; an integrated chain spanning from individual banks to regulatory and judicial authorities is essential, enabling risks to be detected, investigated, and addressed through appropriate action.

In this context, a high-level delegation from the Middle East and North Africa Financial Action Task Force (MENAFATF) visited Damascus on July 23, 2026, holding talks with relevant Syrian authorities to support Syria's preparation for the mutual evaluation process and enhance the effectiveness of its national framework for combating money laundering, terrorist financing, and proliferation financing.

Subsequent moves to combat corruption and financial crime intersect with this trajectory, including a meeting held in Damascus on Sunday, October 4, bringing together a delegation from the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) and officials from the Central Commission for Inspection and Oversight to discuss developing anti-corruption mechanisms in the financial sector, strengthening internal controls, consolidating principles of transparency and integrity, and enhancing oversight performance.

Ultimately, building a compliance architecture requires integrating the work of banks with regulatory, financial, and judicial bodies, and enhancing the capacity to trace financial flows, monitor risks, and investigate suspicious transactions, ensuring the effective implementation of international standards and paving the way for reforming the banking environment itself.

Fourth: Banking Reform and Restructuring

The fragility of the Syrian banking sector compounds the difficulty of moving toward financial integration. State-owned banks require credible independent audits, modern disclosure standards, advanced compliance systems, and substantive alignment with AML/CFT norms. Consequently, the fourth phase of the roadmap focuses on addressing the banking institutions themselves, as upgrading compliance regulations without rebuilding the banks' capacity to enforce them would leave reform confined to the legislative realm.

The gap assessment report prepared by Oliver Wyman for public banks outlined three strategic options to address structural gaps: converting state-owned banks into joint-stock corporations remaining under state ownership but operating under a modern managerial mindset with merit-based appointments and compensation; full privatization and sale to private investors or foreign banks; and entering strategic partnerships with Arab or foreign banks.

These scenarios have been put forward within the ongoing discussion on reforming the six state-owned banks in Syria, with the final decision resting with the government upon completion of the assessment. The significance of these options lies in the objective restructuring is meant to achieve: transitioning public banks from an administrative and operational model with limited risk and credit management capabilities to institutions operating according to modern governance, disclosure, and banking supervision standards. Therefore, selecting the model of restructuring follows the definition of the role required of these banks, rather than serving as a substitute for reforming their systems, governance, capital, technical infrastructure, and compliance capabilities.

In sum, restructuring state-owned banks represents the critical link that transforms compliance requirements from statutory rules into actionable institutional capacity, thereby enhancing the banking sector's readiness to restore trust and relationships with foreign banks.

Fifth: Restoring Trust and International Banking Relationships

Rebuilding correspondent banking relationships emerges as the practical outcome of the preceding phases, as well as the clearest indicator of their success. Lifting legal restrictions paves the way for foreign banks to engage with Syria, yet it is not binding; the decision to enter or restore ties remains tied to each bank's assessment of legal, regulatory, operational, and reputational risks.

Accordingly, the government and the Central Bank of Syria bear the responsibility of translating legal relief into institutional reform. This demands updating legislation, advancing banking supervision, providing credible independent audits, and bolstering the capacity of Syrian banks to substantiate sources of funds, verify customers and beneficial owners, and monitor transfers.

In this context, the visit of the Syrian financial and banking delegation to the United States gains its importance, as discussions shifted from removing restrictions to operationalizing the financial relationship itself. This includes rebuilding correspondent banking ties, developing payment and transfer channels, improving the legal and regulatory framework, and strengthening AML/CFT measures.

This was preceded by a specialized workshop organized by the Ministry of Finance on September 30, 2026, with the participation of a World Bank expert mission. Targeting personnel from the Ministry of Finance and the Central Bank of Syria, the workshop focused on tools for public debt sustainability analysis, financing risk assessment, and stress testing.

The convergence of these tracks within a short timeframe is not coincidental; banking compliance, financial risk management, debt sustainability, oversight, and data quality all constitute integral components in building the trust required to financially reintegrate Syria.

Correspondent banking at this stage becomes a daily stress test for reform: the better Syrian banks can satisfy foreign banks' inquiries regarding customers, beneficial ownership, source of funds, risks, and procedural integrity, the lower the cost of doing business with them becomes, and the higher the likelihood of sustainably restoring banking channels.

Sixth: International Evaluation and Testing the System's Effectiveness

Sequentially, the compliance roadmap concludes at the testing stage, but reform does not end there, as international evaluation will measure whether the prior phases have produced an operable system or merely a set of formal laws and procedures.

Syria is preparing for the mutual evaluation process under MENAFATF—a process that does not merely review the existence of legislation on AML/CFT and counter-proliferation financing, but also assesses its effective implementation and the capacity of institutions to achieve required outcomes. The MENAFATF delegation's visit to Damascus last July was directly aimed at supporting these preparations.

In this sense, Syria faces a test distinct from that of lifting sanctions. While an external political decision can remove legal prohibitions, it cannot substitute for institution-building or grant the banking sector sustainable confidence absent measurable results in combating money laundering, terrorist financing, and financial crimes.

Consequently, the 2027 mutual evaluation will represent the most critical test of Syria's success in translating financial and banking reforms into measurable outcomes. It will determine the level of progress in supervisory effectiveness, risk management, and AML/CFT efforts, and its results will directly impact confidence in the Syrian banking sector and its capacity to expand relations with international banks and financial institutions.

Conclusion

The financial and banking compliance roadmap illustrates that during 2026, Syria entered a transition phase, shifting from addressing the political and legal restrictions that severed its link to the international financial system toward tackling institutional and regulatory gaps within the financial and banking sector itself. This phase has encompassed restoring communication and payment channels, diagnosing the condition of public and private banks, developing the AML/CFT framework, and enhancing supervisory efficiency and risk management, alongside bank restructuring and the reestablishment of correspondent relations with foreign financial institutions.

The success of this path hinges on the ability of the government, the Central Bank of Syria, and regulatory and banking institutions to translate legal and regulatory reforms into measurable and verifiable practices, particularly in governance, disclosure, customer due diligence, tracing financial flows, and risk management. The MENAFATF mutual evaluation represents a principal test of this capacity, and the outcomes of these reforms will directly influence confidence in the Syrian banking sector, the scope of external financial relations, and the economy's ability to attract investment, facilitate trade and remittances, finance reconstruction projects, and deepen its integration into the global financial system.

Researchers